2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Thursday, November 5, 2009

(Vol.10 No.6) FRN V. OLABODE GEORGE & 5 ORS




NAME: OYEWOLE JOSEPH OLABUNMI KAYODE

STATE OF ORIGIN: OSUN

EDUCATION: AUD Primary school, Ijebu ode: 1971-1972, St. Richard's Primary School, Eleiyele, Ibadan: 1973-1976, St.Charles Grammar School, Osogbo: 1976-1981, University of Ife (Now O.A.U), Ile-Ife: 1981-1985, Nigerian Law School: 1985-1986

PROFESSIONAL CAREER: Legal Officer, Public Complaints Commission, Makurdi: 1986-1987, Counsel, Afolabi Adeniran & Co (Legal Practitioners): 1987-1988, Principal Counsel, Olubunmi Oyewole & Co (Legal Practitioners); 1988-2001. Appointed Judge of the High Court of Lagos State: 24th May 2001.

Hobbies: Reading, Gardening and watching sports





IN THE HIGH COURT OF LAGOS STATE
IN THE IKEJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT HIGH COURT NO 33, CRIMINAL DIVISION IKEJA
BEFORE HON. JUSTICE J.O.K. OYEWOLE
TODAY MONDAY TE 26TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2009.

SUIT NO: ID/71c/2008

BETWEEN

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA - COMPLAINANT
AND
1. CHIEF OLABODE GEORGE - DEFENDANT
2. ARCHITECT AMINU DABO - DEFENDANT
3. CAPTAIN O. ABIDOYE - DEFENDANT
4. ALHAJI ABDULAHI AMINU TAFIDA - DEFENDANT
5. ALHAJI ZANNA MAIDARIBE - DEFENDANT
6. ENGR. SULE ALIYU - DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

Editor’s Note:-
The pages of the judgement in this case containing the charges against the defendants, alone number 40. Accordingly they have been edited. Suffice to state here that the accused faced
7 counts of inflawn of contract to section 22 (3) of the corrupt practices and other related offences Act 2000
1 charge of conspiracy to disobey lawful order contrary to section 577 of the criminal code of Lagos State
49 charges of disobedience to lawful order contrary to section 203 of the criminal code of Lagos State 1994
11 charges of Abuse of office

Trial started immediately thereafter in the course of which 10 witnesses testified for the prosecution while only one witness, the 1st defendant testified for the defence. Prosecution tendered 20 exhibits while the Defence tendered 9 exhibits.
PW1 was Ayoola Elijah Ajala a Chief Superintendent of Police attached to thy Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (hereinafter called EFCC) as investigator.
His evidence in chief was that he was co-opted into the Committee set up by the Federal Government to review the activities of the Nigerian Ports Authority under the chairmanship of the then Executive Chairman of the EFCC, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. For ease of reference the said Committee shall hereinafter in this judgment be referred to as "the Ridadu Committee".
He outlined the terms of reference of the said Committee and stated that it submitted Its report to the Government which then forwarded it to the EFCC for more detailed investigation but lie however could not participate in the said investigation as he was transferred out of Lagos. lie identified a certified true copy of the report of the said Committee and it was admitted as exhibit P1.
Under cross-examination from the lead counsel for the 1st defendant Mr. Ayanlaja (SAN), he testified that he was not a signatory to exhibit PI and that the defendants were invited by the said Committee.
Since he took no part in the subsequent investigation he could not testify about it but identified minutes of the 11th Board meeting of the NPA and it was admitted as exhibit Dl.
Shown portions of the said exhibit Dl relating to contracts alleged in the charge to have been inflated he stated that no inflation was apparent on the face thereof and would rather leave detailed testimony to the investigators.
He stated that the work of the Ribadu Committee extended beyond the board to the entire NPA and that the 1st defendant appeared before the said committee but he was not part of those who interacted with him personally.
He stated further that to effectively discharge its functions the committee co-opted professionals from various governmental institutions including theEFCC' and he headed the EFCC group.
He was confronted with a certified true copy of the minutes of the 9th board of directors meeting of the NPA and another certified true copy of the minutes of the 11th board of directors meeting of the NPA and they were admitted as exhibits D2 and D3 respectively. From the two exhibits no contract was seen to have originated from the NPA board, no inflation of contracts was apparent; he could not identify any split contract and not being an expert on pricing he could not testify on it.
He listed the contract approval levels identified by him in NPA and Indicated the difference between the board and management levels.
Under further cross-examination from the learned lead counsel for the 2nd defendant, Mr Adesina (SAN) he stated that was not aware of any government white paper on exhibit PI and was equally not aware it was rejected.
To his knowledge no contractor involved in the Counts being tried was interviewed by the Ribadu Committee, and he also knew that the NPA board used a 1999 guideline for the contracts awarded in the period under review but he was not aware of how the 2001 financial guideline was communicated to the NPA.
He stated that he was aware of a price survey unit in the NPA but would not know how it worked. He however insisted that the board of the NPA had a duty to verily every contract before approving it.
Shown exhibits D1 and D2 once again, he observed that the apparent contents thereof cannot be conclusive as indicated from later investigation and that a representative of the supervising Ministry of Transport participated in the board meetings.
Cross-examined further by Mr. Ojo the lead counsel for the 3rd Defendant, he stated that although he was not aware that exhibit PI was adopted by the Federal Government it was referred to the EFCC for further investigation.
He further Slated that the defendants sitting as board members of the NPA had responsibility to approve or reject contracts.
Under Cross-examination from Mr Sanni for the 4th defendant he stated that the 4th defendant was invited by the Ribadu Committee, that to his knowledge none of the defendants benefited from the awarded contracts and that none of the benefiting companies belonged to them.
Mr IJkoh the learned counsel for the 5th defendant adopted previous cross-examinations of other defence counsel while the lead counsel for the 6th defendant Mr Farounbi cross-examined him further and he stated that he never met the 6th defendant before coming to Court to testify and was not aware of his invitation by the Ribadu Committee.
He was shown exhibit D2 but could not explain why other named board Member were not charged along with the defendants.
He reiterated that no contract originated from the board or 6th defendant in particular and that although the contracts were expected to have been vetted by professionals the board still had responsibility to reject or approve any contract placed before it.
He was re-examined by Mr. Hassan the then lead prosecutor and he clarified the circulars board approval levels. He insisted that the board was not bound to approve all contracts recommended to it by the management.
PW2 was Engineer Mustapha Bukar a senior civil servant and one time director of Maritime in the Federal Ministry of Transport.
His evidence in chief was that in October 2003 he served as Chairman of the Administrative Panel set up by the then Minister of Transport to review contracts awarded by the NPA between 2001 and 2003.
In the course of his said assignment, he interacted with the 1st, 2nd and 31st defendants and identified the two government circulars which formed the basis of the review exercise as well as the interim and final reports of his Committee. They were admitted as exhibits P2 to P5 respectively.
He highlighted some of the irregularities noted by his Committee and reflected in its reports.
Cross-examined by Mr Ayanlaja (SAN) for the 1st defendant he stated-mat the? inclusion in his committee of a person who had previously expressly his grievances about activities of the NPA leadership did not affect its objectivity as the committee also noted the incongruity and ensured the said person played no prominent role in its activities.
He denied that his report was rejected but stated that it led to more detailed investigation.
His committee found that no contract originated from the board and although exhibits P2 and P3 came in the course of the life of the NPA board in which defendants served, the circular exhibit P3 was brought to their attention by the Ministry's representative on the board who later testified as PW4 and was not charged along with the defendants.
While he was aware that government parastatals differed in functions and revenue base, he was also aware that NPA generated its own revenue but he knew nothing of the expenditure limit of the NPA board prior to 2001.
He was shown exhibit P5 and stated that he did not come across any contract that was inflated or split at the board level as these took place at lower levels and while not in agreement with the J.K. Randle price report noted that NPA did not use its Internal price intelligence units.
Further cross-examined by Mr Adesina (SAN) for the 2nd defendant his attention was drawn to the portion of exhibit PI referring to government's views about his report but he insisted that his report was not rejected as the terms of reference of the later Ribadu Committee differed from his.
He once again denied being aware of the previous expenditure limit of the NPA board prior to 2001 and stated that the portion of his report exhibit P5 on the subject was based on information received by the Committee.
Shown the received stamp date on exhibit P3, he stated that it was an error.
Under cross-examination from Mr. Ojo for the 3rd defendant, he stated that he did not know if his report exhibit P5 was adopted by the Federal Government and insisted that although there was no NPA stamp on exhibit P3 it w^ deemed received by all those it was addressed to.
He further stated that his committee disagreed with the Randle price report and did not use it.
The learned counsel for the 4th defendant adopted previous cross-examinations by other defence counsel and under cross-examination from Mr. Ukoh for the 5th defendant he denied being aware that his committee was a fall out of the then feud between the I'1 defendant and the then Minister of Transport.
He admitted that his committee did not invite the 5th defendant and he never met him before appearing in court
Under final cross-examination from Mr Farounbi for the 6th defendant he stated that the 6th defendant was also not invited by his committee and he never mot him as well before coming to testify in court. He would not know if any of the; companies which benefited from the contracts belonged to the 6th defendant. and agreed that exhibit P3 emanated from the Ministry of Water Resources where he presently serves and not Transport.
He was not re-examined.
PW3 was Mr Bamanga Bello an operative of the EFCC. His evidence in chief was that he was co-opted into the Ribadu Committee and led the subsequent EFCC investigations based on the two Committees' reports; exhibits PI and P5 in the course of which assignments he interacted with the defendants.
In the course of the investigations he examined various documents including minutes of board meetings of the NPA which revealed that irregular contracts were awarded at the 9th and 11 board meetings of the NPA. To determine foreign exchange values, he contacted the Central Bank of Nigeria and after examining the minutes exhibits Dl, D2 and D3, relating them to the government circulars exhibit P2 and P3 and applying yardsticks for fair pricing adopted by the Ribadu Committee, he came up with schedules of contracts inflated, split or beyond approval levels. He identified the document to which was attached the prevailing rates in 2001 to 2003 obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria as well as the schedules he made and they were all admitted as exhibits P6 to P9 respectively.
He was shown exhibit PI A and he went through it in details explaining the various entries therein.
Under cross-examination from Mr. Ayanlaja (SAN) for the 1st defendant he gave his academic qualifications and professional experience.
He explained that contract pricing was handled by a technical sub committee which he was not part of but that the criteria used were standard and not arbitrary.
By stated that his investigations took cognizance of the NPA Act and assumed that from the minutes exhibit D2 the defendants were aware of the financial guideline exhibit P3 and could at the stage it was brought to their notice recall all contracts already awarded at that meeting which were beyond the new approval limits.
He further stated that the defendants admitted knowledge of exhibit P3 in their various extra Judicial statements and that he was aware of the various composition of the NPA board during the period under review as well as the various ports under the NPA.
He was shown exhibits P6, P7 and P8 and he stated that apart from the minutes of meetings, he also saw the contract documents relating thereto and explained certain items said to be split.
He agreed that the minutes showed no resolution splitting contracts as the board approved what was presented by management but insisted the approvals were improper and could have been withheld.
He confirmed that the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, 1999 was used as guidelines and also agreed that the NPA is subject to the Minister of Transport but pointed out that going by exhibit D2 the government guideline in issue was forwarded by the said Minister of Transport. He read relevant portions of the said exhibit D2.
He identified the covering letter of the Secretary of the NPA to which was attached the guidelines said to have prevailed in NPA prior to 2001 and both WOT admitted together as exhibit D4.
He conceded that apart from the minutes of the board meeting he did not see any copy of the letter from the Ministry of Transport conveying exhibit P3 to the NPA and when his attention was drawn to the list of members of the Ribadu Committee stated in exhibit PI, he insisted that he was a co-opted member.
When shown discrepancies in the dates in exhibit PI A vis a vis the minutes of the board meetings, he explained that he was guided by the dates in letters of award of the contracts involved.
He reiterated that contracts were awarded by the defendants at prices far above the fair prices determined by the Ribadu Committee and stated that all the allegations now forming the present charge were put to the 1st defendant and his co defendants when they were interviewed individually.
He conceded that as at 2005 when the Committee sat the 2001 financial guidelines was not being used in the NPA but rejected the suggestion that it was because the 2001 guideline was never received. He was shown a letter from the Managing Director of the NPA confirming the prevailing guideline and It was admitted as exhibit D5.
He listed the various levels in the NPA at which contracts are awarded and the various personalities who were managing directors of the NPA in the years under review but pointed out that all the contracts found to be irregular were awarded at the 9th and 11th board meetings during the tenure of the 2nd defendant.
He agreed with the senior defence counsel that all the contracts involved emanated from the end users and that none originated from the board.
He was shown exhibit D3 and he identified certain items therein as examples of an obviously split contract which the board to which the defendants belonged approved thereby shirking their responsibilities.
He also stated that it was found that the NPA disregarded the in house price intelligence unit and acknowledged that some of the board members involved were not arraigned with the defendant which was outside his purview not being a prosecutor but insisted that the defendants were charged based on their personal roles as board members.
Cross-examined further by Mr Adesina (SAN) for the 2nd defendant he once again listed the various contract awarding levels in the NPA but could not remember off hand the names of all the board members of the NPA in the period under review, he however remembered that the secretaries were invited by the Ribadu Committee. When his attention was drawn to the list of members of members of the board in the said period who were not charged with the defendants, he insisted that the prosecution was not selective.
His attention was then drawn to exhibit D5 and he agreed that in 2005 the pre 2001 expenditure guideline was still being used in NPA well after the -defendants had ceased being members of the board.
He was shown the certified true copy of a letter from the secretary to the NPA staling the functions, powers and procedure of the NPA board and it was admitted as D6.
He stated that part of the documents factored into the price mechanism of the Ribadu Committee was the J.K. Randle report and the certified true copy of
the reaction of the NPA leadership to the said report was admitted as exhibit D7.
Under further cross-examination from Mr. Ojo for the 3rd defendant he stated that the NPA failed to put a due process team in place and that the board had supervisory jurisdiction.
He insisted that the identified item in exhibit D3 was split and that the defendants approved inflated contracts denying once again that prosecution was selective.
When cross-examined by Mr. Sanni for the 4th defendant, he stated that the 4th defendant appeared before his investigation team after PW1 had been transferred out of Lagos.
Learned counsel for the 5th defendant adopted the cross-examinations of the other defence counsel while under cross-examination from Mr Farounbi for the 6 defendant he insisted that the defendants represented the board of the NPA in the period under review.
He stated further that the 6th defendant was invited and appeared before his investigation learn and when shown exhibits D2 and D3 he stated that the board approved recommended prices which were inflated even if it never increased any recommended price.
When re-examined he said that he was co-opted into the Ribadu Committee and participated in the deliberations.
PW4 was Alhaji Wali Masur Kurawa a civil servant who sat on the same board of the NPA with the defendants as ex officio member representing the Ministry of Transport.
His evidence in chief was that he attended one out of the three meetings of the NPA board constituting the 9th Board meeting covered by exhibit D2. At the meeting he attended, he drew the attention of the board to the new approved expenditure guidelines but they refused to comply. He identified exhibit P3 as a copy of the guidelines he drew the defendants* attention to.
He confirmed that the said circular exhibit P3 extends to the NPA but would not know if It had been forwarded to the NPA prior to his bringing it to the board's attention. However as the said circular was meant for immediate implementation he expected that it would had been sent to the Managing Director of the NPA.
He stated that none of the defendants objected at that meeting to the decision not to comply with exhibit P3 and explained that contracts awarded by the NPA board in foreign currency were usually calculated at the Central Bank of Nigeria rate.
Under cross-examination from Mr. Ayanlaja (SAN) for the F1 defendant he was able to recall his invitation and testimony before the Ribadu Committee.
Because he left the NPA in 2004 he was not aware of exhibit D5 but knew that prior to the circular exhibit P3 the approval guideline in NPA was the 1999 guideline which gave N60million ceiling to the board.
He stated that no contract was awarded at the third and last session of the 9th board meeting where he brought up the circular exhibit P3 and now recalled that he attended a previous session of the said 9th board meeting where contracts were awarded.
He stated further that communications between the Minister of Transport and the NPA would either be in writing to the Managing Director or through the Ministry's representative on the board.
He reiterated that he would not know if the circular exhibit P3 had been communicated to the NPA before he did and that prior to that time he too was unaware of its existence.
To his knowledge the board did not inflate or split any contract although board papers were usually delivered late which he complained about.
He agreed that if implemented exhibit P3 could cripple port activities and recommended enhanced limits for the NPA in his testimony before the Ribadu Committee same as the former Minister of Transport, Mr Abiye Sekibo. He identified the minutes of the Ribadu Committee related thereto and it was admitted as exhibit D8.
Under further cross-examination from Mr. Adesina (SAN) he confirmed that decisions of the board were joint but was not conversant with the operations of the departments in NPA.
He staled that no contract originated from the board and that none was awarded at a higher price than recommended by management. He further stated that due to its sensitive nature, NPA needed to be able to take quick decisions.
Further cross-examined by Mr OJo for the 3rd defendant he stated that he was directed to bring up exhibit P3 at the board's meeting when the Minister of Transport noted that NPA was not complying therewith and to make up for the lapse of the planning department in the Ministry which had responsibility for circulating such directives, the Minister then wrote and he circulated.
He insisted that exhibit P3 emanated from appropriate quarters.
Learned counsel for the 4th, 5th and 6th defendants adopted the previous cross-examinations of the other defence counsel.
When re-examined he identified exhibit D5 as the circular stipulating previous approval level but noted that it did not actually contain N60 million limit for the NPA board as he previously stated under cross-examination.
PW5 was Mr Usman Jida Shuwa a civil servant. His evidence in chief was that he Is presently the director of administration in the Ministry of Interior but was the successor of W4 in the Ministry of Transport, He knew all the defendants except the 1st defendant and was a full member of thy Ribadu Committee, and chaired most of the meetings of the said committee in the absence of the substantive Chairman, Mallam Ribadu.
He recounted his wide experience in the Civil Service giving details of various positions previously held by him and identified exhibit D8 as minutes of several meetings of the said Ribadu Committee.
He also gave details of how the circular exhibit P3 emerged and stated that the NPA board failed to comply with it but rather continued to rely on the 1999 guidelines. The findings of his Committee as contained in exhibit PI also Included Inflation and splitting of contracts.
He identified (SKhibit D4 as the 1999 guidelines relied on by the NPA board.
He stated that Ministries were duty bound to convey government circulars to their parastatals which by the content of exhibit D2 was done in respect of exhibit P3 and that issues relating to inflation and splitting of contracts were handled by a technical sub-committee whose report was adopted by the larger Ribadu committee.
He defined what constitutes splitting of contracts in government procurement parlance.
Under cross-examination from Mr. Ayanlaja (SAN) for the 1st defendant he spelt out the communication channel between the Ministry of Transport and its parastatals and stated that although he saw no letter from the Minister of Transport to the NPA on exhibit P3 he was aware that PW4 brought it to the Defendants’ attention as shown in exhibit D2.

CONTINUED FROM LAST WEEK….
He was sure that prior to exhibit P3 the financial guideline was not exhibit D4 as according to him no Minister had powers to unilaterally stipulate financial guideline for parastatals under him and produced the Government financial guidelines which preceded exhibit P3 and it was admitted as exhibit D9.

He confirmed that no contract emanated from the board but contended that the board was not bound to approve all recommendations made to it. He admitted not being part of the Ministry of Transport during the period under review but could not ascertain whether exhibit D9 was shown to the defendants or PW4 by his committee even when shown the minutes of the proceedings of that Committee exhibit D8 and was not aware of any disciplinary measures taken against the signatory to exhibit D4 for writing the said letter.

His attention was drawn to the views of the then Minister of Transport that the implementation of exhibit P3 would ground the ports and in reaction thereto he stated that while this could be so, the right procedure was to bring the situation to the President's attention for a waiver to be granted.

He stated further that his knowledge of the contracts involved emanated from the evidence presented to his Committee and was sure that defendants were confronted with allegations of contract splitting and inflation which they all denied.

Under further cross-examination from Mr. Adesina (SAN) for the 2nd Defendant he stated that exhibit P3 was meant for all government ministries and parastatals including NPA and that none can claim exemption and further that after being made aware of exhibit P3 the defendants continued to award contracts in disregard thereof.

He willed that he was posted to the Ministry of Transport in 2005 as Maritime Director but he never sat on the board of NPA as the board was not constituted during his tenure.

He was shown exhibit pi and confirmed that it did not contain names of contractor's involved in the Counts being tried and when shown exhibit D9 he also confirmed that the certification thereon was made by the EFCC but insisted that all Government Ministries and Parastatals got the said exhibit D9.


He stated that he did not sign exhibit PI as Chairman since Mallam Nuhu Ribadu was the appointed Chairman and agreed with the learned senior counsel that exhibit D4 preceded the defendants' membership of the NPA board and that exhibit D6 written by the Legal Adviser to the NPA conforms with exhibit D4 which the defendants said they complied with.

Further cross-examined by Mr Ojo for the 3rd defendant he stated that he did not know if exhibit PI was adopted by the Federal Executive Council.

He insisted that the board members of the NPA had responsibility to ensure that only proper contracts were approved and to also direct management in appropriate circumstances.

He said that while serving as Director of Maritime Services in the Ministry of Transport exhibit D4 was never brought to his attention and denied the suggestion that exhibit D9 was prepared for the purposes of this trial insisting [t was a genuine government circular.

Mr, Sanni for the 4th defendant adopted the previous cross-examinations of the other defence counsel while he was cross-examined by Mr. Ukoh for the 5th defendants and he stated that government circulars on the face thereof never state the law enabling them.

Under cross-examination from Mr Farounbi for the 6th defendant he stated that only the 1st and 2nd defendants appeared before his Committee but he did not know the capacity in which the defendants were charged and was not aware of any other instance where anyone other than PW4 brought exhibit P3 to the attention of the defendants.

When re-examined by the learned prosecutor he stated that exhibit D9 was the appropriate operating financial guideline before exhibit P3 and not exhibit D4 which had no legal mandate,

PW6 was Mr Olanrewaju Yusuf Olaleye a quantity surveyor and civil servant in the Federal Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development.

His evidence in chief was that he has about 18 years professional experience and initially served as a pioneer consultant to the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit located in the Presidency otherwise called the Due Process Office before he was later absorbed into the Federal Civil Service.

He was a member of the Ribadu Committee and chaired the technical sub-committee which handled the issue of pricing of contracts for which exercise he co-opted relevant professionals from various governmental bodies related to NPA activities.

His technical sub-committee inspected all available contract records painstakingly and physically inspected various project sites where possible. Prices were determined using acceptable industry standards and at the end of the exercise they found some of the contract prices fair, some high and some indeterminable due to absence of documents. They also found incidents of splitting and inflation of contracts.

in line with standard professional practice, their findings were initially made across to the defendants and others affected for them to have the opportunity to respond and possibly provide justifying documents. They obtained responses from some of the past Managing directors and these responses were reflected in the final report but none of the board members responded.

He identified exhibit PI A as the findings of his Committee any explained how fair price of the contracts involved were determined emphasizing that his Committee was thorough and fair.

Under cross-examination from Mr. Ayanlaja (SAN) for the 1st defendant he denied being aware of any price intelligence unit in the NPA and did not personally ask about it. He also did not personally question the defendants when they appeal'o4 before the Committee as he was busy at the premises of the NPA with the activities of his technical sub-commute but he attended meetings of the main committee.

Despite the enormity of the necessary expenditure profile of the NPA which could be striped with the implementation of exhibit; P3 he still felt the proper thing was to obtain presidential waiver instead of willful disobedience.

He stated that he found mat all contracts approved by the defendants originated from the user departments which did not include board members and that the board minutes did not reflect resolutions to split or inflate contracts but that the approvals made were irregular for failing to comply with government guidelines.

He stated further that due to the absence of resident due process teams in the NPA, it was impossible for him to identify the stage in the process when contracts splitting and inflation occurred but that the approvals by the defendants were not disputed.

He did not agree that the "NPA was not covered by exhibits P2 and P3 and insisted that as directed by exhibit P2, the NPA board as final authority ought to have set up due process teams different from appraisal officers in use in NPA,

He further insisted that the defendants were afforded right of reply to the report of his technical sub-committee but failed to utilize it unlike past Managing Directors and Managers who exploited the opportunity.

He was of the view that PW4 was not a full member of the NPA board as he only represented the Ministry of Transport and when shown exhibit D9, the minutes of some of his Committee meetings he conceded that the only issue put lo the 1st defendant was about approval beyond limit but he was resolute that a review of the minutes of the relevant NPA board meetings in question will reveal splitting of contracts.

He said that the term 'split of contracts' as shown in exhibits P2 and P3 had special meaning in procurement and that the defendants were notified in that sense but could not say whether exhibit P2 was received in the NPA. He specifically referred to pages 75 and 78 of exhibit D2 as example of a split contract which the defendants wrongly approved.

He stated that his committee was concerned about the entire approving and awarding authorities in the NPA which included the defendants and that the absence of due process teams allowed the prevalence of arbitrariness in the NPA although no appraisal officer confessed such to him.

He explained that before any contract could be approved by the Federal Executive- Council it would be accompanied by a due process certificate unlike what obtained in the NPA board in which the defendants served.

He stated that he never personally met or interviewed PW4 as he interacted with some appraisal officers but was aware he represented the Ministry of Transport on the NPA board. He insisted that price determinants are standard and once again explained how fair prices in this instance were arrived at. He agreed with the learned senior counsel that knowledge of exhibits P2 and P3 was crucial to compliance therewith.

Further cross-examined by Mr. Adesina for the 2nd defendant he pointed out that only the presidency had a due process department and that what NPA did not have in place was a due process team comprising relevant professionals. He further stated that all contracts ought to have a due process certificate but agreed that this was not indicated in exhibit PI, the committee's report.

He maintained that he actively compiled exhibit PI A with his committee members and that he is a pioneer consultant on due process in the country.

He said that his price evaluation included cost of training and when his attention was drawn to exhibits D2 and D3 concerning contracts mentioned in Counts 1-7 whose awarded prices included cost of staff training, he agreed that it would affect the final price.

He also agreed that contracts awarded by the defendants were done at below contractor quotes and that none of the defendants worked as appraisal officers in NPA.

Concerning appropriate foreign exchange rates, he stated that he relied on exhibit P9 despite the date on the covering letter thereof but agreed that contractors were not bound to source their foreign currency needs from the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Shown exhibit P1 he conceded that none of the contractors involved in the counts being tried was interviewed by his Committee but however explained that this was deliberate to avoid possibility of prejudice.

He stated that he sent out his subordinates to find out prices from manufacturers representatives and agents locally and was well aware of the disagreements with the J.K. Randle prices but that his Committee only relied on some other aspects of the said report other than pricing.

When asked about the other publications and documents relied on for pricing guidance, he responded that they were not in court and could not recall their names in full offhand.

Under additional cross-examination from Mr. Ojo for the 3rd defendant, he stated that the defendants were concerned with contract approvals after their subordinates must have completed the preliminary stages. He maintained his earlier definition of contract splitting and insisted that the defendant approved split contracts even if from exhibits D2 and D3 they did not pass any resolution to split contracts.

Learned counsel for the 4th and 5th defendants adopted the previous cross-examinations of the other defence counsel while under more cross-examination from Mr Farounbi for the 6th defendant he stated that no single contract approved by the defendants had due process certification and that notwithstanding the content of exhibit PI, PW4 was not a full member of the board 4th he only represented the Ministry of Transport-He agreed with the learned counsel that his sub-committee solely handled technical issues.

When re-examined by learned lead prosecutor, he stated that what guided his committee on foreign exchange was the attachment to exhibit P9 and not the covering letter.

PW7 was Mr Azuonye Okorocha a staff of the Central Bank of Nigeria. His evidence in chief was that his office received a letter from the EFCC asking for the prevailing foreign exchange rates from 2001 to 2003 and the said information was supplied.

He identified exhibit P9 as the letter signed by him for the Central Bank of Nigeria and that the attachment thereto represented the requested rates for 2001 to 2003 which is system generated and unalterable.

Under cross-examination from Mr. Ayanlaja (SAN) for the 1st defendant he stated that foreign exchange rates are determined on daily basis while the attachment to exhibit P9 does not reflect daily entries.

Under further cross-examination from Mr. Adesina (SAN) for the 2nd defendant he read the attachment to exhibit P9 showing monthly rates.

Learned counsel for the remaining defendants adopted the cross-examination already made and he was not re-examined.

PW8 was Mr Sanusi Mohammed an operative of the EFCC. His evidence in chief was that he got to know the defendants through his Involvement in the investigation of this case in the course of which he supervised thy extra judicial statements made to the EFCC by the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th defendants.

He identified the said statements and they were admired as exhibits P10, P11, P12 and P13 respectively.

Cross-examination for the 1st defendant he stated that his only role was supervising the statements he tendered. Other defence counsel adopted the cross-examination made for the 1st defendant and he was not re-examined.

PW9 was Mr. Temilu Alkali also an operative of the EFCC. His evidence in chief was that he knew the defendants during the investigation Of this case and personally interviewed the 1st and 2nd defendants when they made statements to the EFCC. He identified the statements made by the 1st defendant and they were admitted as exhibits PI 4 to PI 8 respectively.

Under cross-examination for the I'1 defendant he insisted that by was present and supervised the making of exhibit P14 by the 1st defendant in Abuja and also witnessed the remaining ones in Lagos. He stated that his only role was in supervising the making of the statements in question.

He was not cross-examined by the remaining defence Counsel and was also not re-examined.

PW10 was Mr. Ibrahim Shetima an engineer with the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency otherwise called NIMASA. His evidence in chief that he was co-opted into technical sub-committee of the Ribadu Committee under the leadership of PW6 which dealt with issues of contract splitting and inflation. He saw documents relating to the contracts involved and as an electrical Engineer visited most of the sites physically and .also for price Verification visited manufacturers, manufacturer's representatives, agents and in some cases checked the internet.

He identified exhibit PI A as the findings of his sub-committee and pointed out item 18 thereon as an instance of split contract and item 4 as inflated contract arid explained how he came to the conclusion,

Under cross-examination for the 1st defendant he stated that he was not aware of the professional leaning of the 5th defendant and never knew there was any engineer on the board of NPA.

He agw4 that the contracts in question originated from end users and also agreed that what he saw on the internet was the price situation as at 2005 which Would not contain maintenance and training costs factored in for many of the contracts in issue.

He stated that in 2005 he had about 3 years experience in procurement and that the contract documents relied on by him were available but not produced in court.

Ho further stated that the total yardstick for assessing the contract prices was provided by PW6 and that he personally visited the site of agenda item 13 of exhibit D2 with PW3.

He agreed that he was not the sole electrical engineer in the committee and did not work with exhibit D2 or any minutes or document prepared by the board but instead used the bill of quantities and contract award papers.

Further crossexamination for the 2nd defendant he stated that he did not know the capacity in which the defendants were charged or whether they were also NPA contractors. He instead that his task in the committee included verification of prices.

Cross-examined further for the 3rd defendant he agreed that appraisal officers in NPA fixed prices and not the board.

Learned counsel for the 4th and 5th defendants adopted previous cross-examinations of the other counsel and in answer to the additional cross-examination for the 6th defendant he stated that the inflation of item 4 in exhibit P1A Is included in the report and that he was not aware of the prices approved by the board.

When re-examined he stated that he limited his search on the internet to prices and did not consider staff training and maintenance.

With the consent of all defence counsel PW3 was recalled by the prosecution and he tendered the extra judicial statements made to the EFCC by the 2nd defendant and they were admitted as exhibits P19 and P20 respectively.

He was not cross-examined by all the defence counsel and with his evidence this prosecution closed its case.

The defence opted to call evidence and the 1st defendant testified from the witness box as the sole defence witness.

He is Chief Olabode George an engineer and company director who described himself as a politician by vocation.

In his evidence in chief he traced his academic background and professional experience in the Nigerian Navy until his retirement and his political career in civil life afterwards.

From 2001 to 2003 he was the Chairman of the Board of directors of the NPA and the other defendants were some of the director who served with him on this said board. He listed those who served as lumbers of his board including PW4 Who were however left out of the present trial by the prosecution.

Oh being inaugurated they were briefed by the secretary of the board who gave them the enabling Act, standing orders of the board and, the approved expenditure limits. His perusal of the said enabling Act made it clear to him that the sole authority representing the government to which the board was answerable was the Minister of Transport. Using exhibit D4 as example he pointed out that the standard communication between the Minister of Transport and the NPA is through the Managing Director of the NPA.

He stated that he understood the counts dealing with alleged splitting of contracts and denied he or the board he was pan of, ever doing so. He used agenda 12 of exhibit D2 as an example to show how contracts were presented to the board by the executive director in charge of the user department with a recommendation based on the appraised price and eventually the resolution to award without splitting coming into the discussion.

He similarly denied the counts dealing with alleged inflation of contracts stating emphatically that no such act was undertaken by the board over which he presided as they never added to any recommended price.

He explained the functions of appraisal officers within the NPA stating that they had responsibilities for issues relating to consideration of quotations and recommendation of prices of items presented to the board for approval, the board had no responsibility to determine fair prices and only worked with recommended prices of management.

On allegations of awarding contracts beyond approval limits he stated once again that he understood the counts and explained what constituted the approval limits of the various contract awarding levels in the NPA based on the guidelines given to them on assumption of office and which still operated till date.

According to him, the responsibility for setting approval limits rested with the Minister of Transport in consultation with the President and that due to its commercial and sensitive nature, subject to the directives of the Minister, NPA had financial autonomy.

He was shown exhibit P3 arid he was emphatic that it was not the approval limit he received from the Minister of Transport and that he and the other defendants never got the said document whilst in office and never acknowledged receiving it. When PW4 brought a copy of the said circular to their attention, they felt it was irregular not having been forwarded under the hands of the Minister of Transport to the Managing Director and that it was administrative since it was signed by the Finance Minister.

When referred to the portion of exhibit D2, the board minutes where exhibit P3 was discussed, he stated that the said portion of the minutes was incorrect and gave his own version of what transpired at the said meeting.

He stated that no contract was awarded at the meeting where exhibit P3 was circulated and discussed and no response was received to their letter to the Minister of Transport on the said exhibit P3 asking for clarifications as implementation would have crippled the NPA considering its complex nature and the highly intensive expenditure profile.

He explained steps taken by the board to secure mobilization fees approved on contracts and denied ever receiving exhibit P2. He also denied any conspiracy to disobey lawful instructions as alleged.

Under cross-examination for the 2nd defendant he explained the complex and international implications of the operations of the NPA and the expected role of the board under the NPA Act.

He gave the names of other members of the board who were left out of the charge by the prosecution including PW4 who according to him never objected to any of their decisions.

He was shown exhibit P3 and he pointed out that it has the stamp of the Federal Ministry of Water Resources insisting that the 2nd defendant never received any such document to his knowledge. He further stated that no other contract was approved after exhibit P3 was received and discussed and that exhibit D4 which they relied on came from the Minister of Transport and preceded the appointment of all the defendants to the NPA board and also conformed with exhibit D6 the brief from the legal adviser of the board and exhibit D5 which was still in use in NPA as at 2008.

He stated that the board did not confer a unilateral approval limit on itself and that the reasons adduced for not complying with exhibit P3 were genuine.

He denied all the counts and insisted that the board in which all the defendants served never inflated nor split any contract as alleged and made copious references to the minutes.

Further cross-examined for the 3rd defendant he explained the processes a contract would have passed through from the user department before getting to the board for approval asserting that the board did not appraise prices and never engaged in contract splitting or inflation.

(Vol.10 No.5) ADEYEMO V. GOV. LAGOS (scanned)

(Vol.10 No.4) BUARI V. COMM. FOR FINANCE LAGOS

Oshodi.J
IN THE HIGH COURT OF LAGOS STATE
IN THE IKEJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT IKEJA
BEFORE HON. JUSTICE O.H. OSHODI
JUDGE
COURT NO 32. GENERAL CIVIL, REVENUE AND MORTGAGE
DIVISIONS
TODAY WEDNESDAY THE 4TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2008

SUIT NO. ID/127M/2008

BETWEEN:

1. LUKMAN BUARI
2. LADI FAGBENJA ... CLAIMANTS

AND

1. COMMISSIONER FOR FINANCE LAGOS STATE
2. LAGOS STATE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
3. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE ... DEFENDANTS

Adebayo Haroun for the 1st & 3rd Defendants.
No appearance for 2nd Defendant.
No appearance for Claimant.

JUDGMENT

This Judgment was to have been delivered on Monday, 1st December 2008, but for the strike embarked upon by the staff of the Judiciary. The Court is fully aware of the Constitutional requirement as contained in section 294 (1). The only reason why the Judgment was not delivered as scheduled is for the reason stated above. It is the candid view and opinion of the Court that no miscarriage of justice will be suffered by any of the parties herein.

The Claimants herein commenced this suit by causing to be filed an Originating Summons dated 25th February 2008, but sealed on 27th February 2008. By the Originating Summons, hereinafter referred to as the 'application', the Claimants seek for the determination of the following questions:

1. "Whether by virtue of Section 4,5, and item 59 of the Exclusive legislative fist in the 1999 constitution the administration and collection of Personal Income Tax is within the exclusive Legislative and Executive jurisdiction of the Federal Government or State Government".

2. "Whether by virtue of combined effect of Sections 2,8,25,26,59 and 68 of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007, the Defendants has (sic) the right to assess, collect and or enforce the payment of the Claimants' Personal Income Tax contrary to the provisions of the Act herein cited".

3. "Whether by virtue of provision of sections 2 and 68 of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007, the Claimants ate obliged or liable to payment of Personal Income Tax to the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service (the 2nd Defendant)".

The Claimants, by the application, are seeking for the following reliefs:
1. "A Declaration that by virtue Sections 4 & 5 and item 59 of the Exclusive Legislative list in the 1999 constitution, administration and collection of Personal Income Tax is with the exclusive Legislative and Executive jurisdiction of the Federal Government and not the State Government".

2. "A Declaration that by virtue of the provisions of Section 2, 8, 25, 26, 59 and 68 of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007 the Defendants has (sic) no right or power to assess, collect, review and enforce payment of Income Tax against the Claimants".

3. "A Declaration that by virtue of the provisions of Sections 2,8,25,26,59 and 68 of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007, the Claimant (sic) is not obliged or liable to payment of Income Tax to the 2nd Defendant (the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service) as demanded".

4. "A Declaration that the public notice published by the Defendants in the Punch Newspaper of 31st of January 2008, in Introducing its self assessment procedure of Personal Income Tax to be used for all tax payers in Lagos State including the Claimants as to payment of their Tax to the 2nd Defendant in contravention of the provisions of Federal Inland Revenue Act 2007, is illegal, null and void".

5. Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, servant (sic) and howsoever from assessing, collecting or enforcing payment of Income Tax against the Claimants".

6. "Cost of this action".

In support of the application is a 23 paragraphed affidavit deposed to by the 15t Claimant. A document, which is a copy of a self assessment guide, is attached to the affidavit as exhibit. A written address dated 25th February 2008, raising 3 issues for determination, was also filed along with the application.

Upon being served, the 2nd Defendant caused to be filed a memorandum of appearance and later on filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 22nd May 2008. This Notice of Preliminary Objection was on 18th September 2008 withdrawn by learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant. To the application, a counter affidavit of 12 paragraphs deposed to by one Oduwole Gbemisola, a legal officer with the 2nd Defendant, was filed challenging the application. To this counter affidavit, a written address, dated 22nd May 2008, in which the objection was considered and the issues raised by the Claimants in their written address were argued upon, was filed.

The 1st & 3rd Defendants, after being granted leave, filed a joint counter affidavit to the application deposed to by one Olorunnisomo Tolu, a Senior State Counsel in the Chambers of the 3rd Defendant. A document, probably generated from the internet, is attached to this counter affidavit as exhibit. A written address in which 2 issues are raised was filed along with the counter affidavit.

Interestingly, these latter set of Defendants, filed a 'Counter-Claim' against the Claimants. The Counter-Claim is dated 23rd May 2008. In the Counter-claim, these set of Defendants are seeking as follows:

1. "A Declaration that the provisions of sections 2, 8,25,26, 59 and 68 of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) Act 2007 are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 4 (2) and (4) and Item D Paragraph 7 of Part II of the 2nd Schedule of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 and therefore invalid, null and void".

2. "A Declaration that to the extent of taking away the taxing power or right of the State Government to assess, collect and enforce payment of tax on income or profit of persons resident in Lagos State (except personnel of Armed Forces Police Force and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) Act 2007 is a gross violation of the established principle of fiscal Federalism in the constitution of Nigeria 1999 and therefore null and void".

3. "A Declaration that to the extent of taking away the tasking (sic) power or right of the State Government to assess, collect and enforce payment of tax on capital gain and stamp duty on persons and non corporate bodies resident in Lagos State, the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) Act 2007 is a gross violation of the established principle of fiscal federalism in the constitution of Nigeria 1999 and therefore null and void".

4. "A Declaration that the Claimants being residents in Lagos State are obliged to continue to comply with the directives of the Defendants to pay their income tax to the State Government and no other body".

5. "A Declaration that the Personal Income Tax Act Decree 104 of 1993 NOW Cap P8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 is an existing Law valid, subsisting and binding on the Claimant (sic)".

6. "A Declaration that by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 Personal Income Tax Act, Capital Gain Tax Act and Stamp Duty Act, the Defendant (sic) have the right and power to assess, collect, review and enforce payment of income tax, capital gain tax and stamp duty on individuals and non-corporate bodies resident in Lagos State including the Claimants".

On the 18th September 2008, the application was formally moved. In moving the application, learned counsel to the Claimants, O. Ibrahim Esq.; referred to the reliefs in the application, the contents of the affidavit in support together with the exhibit attached and adopted his written address. Learned counsel then urged the Court to grant the application. After the submission of learned counsel, the Court then directed him to address the Court as to the issue of the locus standi of the Claimants. In his short reply or submission, learned counsel referred to paragraphs 16,17 & 19 of the affidavit in support.

In objecting to the application, learned counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendant, Lawal Pedro S.A.N. referred to the contents of the counter affidavit filed for these Defendants and adopted his written submission. Learned S.A.N. then withdrew reliefs 2 & 3 as appearing in the Counter-Claim. On the propriety of the Counter-claim, that is, whether such a procedure is appropriate where the suit is commenced using the Originating Summons procedure, learned S.A.N. relied on the decision in PEENOCK V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1982) 12 SC PG 1.

It is submitted on behalf of the 1st & 3rd Defendants, with reference to issue 1 raised by the Claimants, that where there is a law that deals with a general subject, tike the FIRS Act 2007 and another law with a particular subject, like the Personal Income Tax Law, the latter will prevail. Reliance is placed on AQUA LTD V ONDO S.S.C. (1988) 4 NWLR PT 91 PG 622 @ 641 – 642 and CROWN STAR & CO. LTDV THE VESSEL, M.V. VALI (2000) 1 NWLR PT 637 PG 37 @ 60.

On issue 2, it is submitted that the word "may" in line 1 of item D of paragraph 7 of Concurrent Legislative List should be read to mean "shall" as imposing duties on the National Assembly to vest power of assessment and collection of Personal Income Tax Act in the State. Learned S.A.N then referred to the decision in RABIU V GOVERNMENT OF KANO STATE (1989) 4 NWLR PT 117 PG 517 and urged the Court to dismiss the application.

On her on part, learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant, Mrs. F. A. Afolayan, referred to the contents of the counter affidavit filed for the 2nd Defendant and adopted her written address urging the Court to dismiss the case.

At the conclusion of addresses by learned counsels present, the Court then asked whether it was procedural permissible for a party to file a counter-claim in an action begun by way of Originating Summons. To this question, learned S.A.N contended that an Originating Summons, by the Rules of Court, is an Originating process, which calls for defence. Learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant aligned herself with the contention of Mr. Pedro S.A.N, while learned counsel to the Claimants simply told the Court that he had no problem with the counter-claim.

It must be stated that after conclusion of addresses, and the suit had been adjourned for Judgment, a correspondence dated 9th October 2008, written by learned counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendants was brought to the attention of the Court. In this written correspondence, further authorities were brought to the attention of the Court, especially on the interpretation of the word "may" as appearing in Statutes and the proprietness of filing a counter-claim to an action began by way of Originating Summons.

The Court has read the contents of the affidavits filed in respect of the application. The Court has also read the contents of the written submissions filed also in respect of the application. These written submissions are herewith incorporated into this Ruling with specific reference made to them when the need arises. However, before going on into the merit or demerit of this action, together with the counter-claim, the Court will like to make an observation.

As stated above, this action was commenced by way of Originating Summons with an affidavit in support. The 1st & 3rd Defendants filed a counter-claim. It is noted that the Claimants did not file any defence to the counter-claim, nor did the 1st & 3rd Defendants support the counter-claim with any form of pleadings!

To this Court, the critical issue that must first be determined is whether the Claimants have shown any locus standi to seek the reliefs sought for. This issue was raised by the 2nd Defendant by way of preliminary objection, which was withdrawn and treated in the written address filed along with its counter affidavit. At the conclusion of addresses, the Court suo motto raised this issue of locus standi. Learned counsel to the Claimants referred to paragraphs 16,17 &19 of the affidavit in support to show the locus of the Claimants,

In EJIWUNMI V COSTAIN (W.A.) PLC (1998) 12 NWLR PT 576 PG 149, it is held that the first way to determine whether a Claimant has the necessary capacity to institute the action is to examine the statement of claim and see if he has any enforceable connection with the subject matter. There must be a nexus between the Claimant and the disclosed cause of action concerning his rights or obligations which has been breached or threatened to be violated. Further, it is held that the term locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law or tribunal to enforce a right recognized by law. It is the right to appear before a court to prosecute or defend an action affecting a legal right. The best way to determine whether the Claimant has the necessary capacity to institute this action is to examine the statement of claim and see if he has any enforceable connection with the subject matter. To summarize, there must be a nexus between the Claimants and the Defendants and the disclosed cause of action concerning their rights and obligations which has been breached or threatened to be violated.

The Court of Appeal in AGWARAMGBO V UBN (2001) 4 NWLR PT 702 PG 1, held that the meaning of locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court. The fundamental aspect of locus standi is that it focuses on the capacity of the party seeking to present his complaint before a court of law and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. The question whether or not a Claimant has locus standi is determinable from the totality of all the averments in his statement of claim. See also WILLIAMS VDAWODU (1988) 4 NWLR PT 87 PG 189 @ 192 and OLUBODUN VLAWAL (2008) 9 MJSC PG 1.

With these statements of law in mind, an examination of the affidavit in support now becomes imperative. As stated, the 1st Claimant deposed to the affidavit in support. In the affidavit, the deponent stated that before the commencement of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007, he and the other Claimant had been paying their Personal Income Tax as at when due to the Lagos State Government. He however failed to exhibit proof of this assertion. The deponent then reproduced the provisions of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007 and the Constitution and further deposed that on 31st January 2008, the 2nd Defendant put an advert in the Punch Newspaper, exhibit "A", and that by virtue of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007, he and the 2nd Claimant fall within the category of people who must pay their taxes to the Federal Inland Revenue Service on demand. How they fall into this category is not stated!

This brief recount of the deposition of the 1st Claimant is what gives the Claimants, 2 in number in this action, the locus standi to institute this action, jointly, as submitted by their learned counsel.

Now, nowhere in the affidavit did any of the Claimants deposed to the fact that they had paid their personal income tax as at when due. Proof of payment of such income tax is kept away from the view of the Court. None of the Claimants deposed that they had been assessed by the Federal Inland Revenue Service, and that they had paid their current taxes. None of the Claimants deposed that the 2nd Defendant had sent them any assessment to which they are contesting. But their claim to fame is that they saw an advert in the newspapers, and it is this advert that gives them a right of action in this regard!

With respect to learned counsel to the Claimants, the Claimants have not shown any nexus between them and the disclosed cause of action concerning their rights or obligations which has been breached or threatened to be violated. Reading an advert in the newspaper does not confer them any locus standi to bring this action. The question to ask is what capacity are the Claimants bringing this action? They have not proved that they are tax payers, or tax compliant, as nothing to this effect is before the Court.

In the written address filed on behalf of the Claimants, their learned counsel talked about 'double taxation'. However, how he arrived at that suggestion is not laid before the Court. It is one thing to submit or contend, it is another thing to rest submissions and contentions on hard proof. For the avoidance of repetition, what other taxes have the Claimants paid, in which they want to avoid double taxation? A far as the Court is concerned, none. They are the ones to produce evidence of payment of taxes, and it is not for the Court to assume that indeed, these Claimants are tax compliant!

The 2nd Defendant, in the counter affidavit, paragraph 3 thereof, deposed that these Claimants have not paid any tax to the Government of Lagos State and neither have they paid to the Federal Government. This deposition was not challenged or controverted by any of the Claimants. Further, the 2nd Defendant deposed that the Federal Inland Revenue Service has not assessed or demanded income tax from the Claimants. This deposition was also not challenged or refuted. It is trite that a fact in an affidavit not challenged or controverted is presumed to be correct.

As rightly submitted by learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant, in paragraph 2.3 of the written address, the Claimants have not disclosed any fact concerning their interest, status and or injury suffered in relation to the acts or omissions of the 2nd Defendant or have they shown how the advert affected or applied to them.

With these findings the Court holds that the Claimants have no locus standi to institute this present action.

The next issue for consideration is the appropriateness of the counter-claim filed by the 1st & 3rd Defendants. As stated, the 1st & 3rd Defendants did not file any 'pleading' to put flesh to their claims. Also, the Claimants did not file any 'pleading' or defence to the counter-claim. What is just before the Court are claims or reliefs being sought for without any fact supporting them.

It is trite that a counter-claim is a separate action to the main claim. There is nowhere in our Rules of Court that permits the filing of a counter-claim in an action began by way of Originating Summons. Learned S.A.N., in his submissions referred the Court to section 2 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004. I think he means High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Law 2004, and not 'Rules'.

By the provision of this section, the Court is empowered to adopt such procedure as will in its view do substantial justice between the parties concerned where no adequate provisions are made in the Rules, (Italics and underlining mine for emphasis).

Learned S.A.N. then made reference to Order 28 Rule 7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, England and also Order 40 Rule 6 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000.

To this Court, notwithstanding the urging of learned S.A.N, the procedure adopted by the 1st & 3rd Defendants is not permissible by our Rules of Court. By Order 17 Rule 16 of our Rules of Court, a Respondent to an Originating Summons shall file a counter affidavit together with all the exhibits he intends to rely upon and a written address within 21 days after service of the Originating Summons. This provision did not talk about any 'counter-claim' in an Originating Summons proceeding. Further, Order 17 Rules 6 & 7 provides for counter-claim. A close reading of these rules will clarify the issue that a counter-claim, which is an independent action, always follows a statement of defence and not an affidavit, be it counter affidavit.

Now, in my view, it will be improper to allow the procedure adopted by learned S.A.N. This is more so that the Rules of the Supreme Court England, which is basically the same as that of the Federal High Court, he relies upon gives the Court the discretion to Order the counter-claim to be struck out or tried separately. Further, as stated above, there are no facts or pleadings to support the reliefs or claims being sought in the counter-claim.

Another reason why the counter-claim is incompetent is that the proper parties for the just determination of the reliefs sought are not before the Court.

The proper parties to answer the live issues arising out of prayers 1,4,5 & 6, the 2nd & 3rd prayers having been withdrawn, of the counter-claim are not before the Court. The 1st & 3rd Defendants want the Court to declare some sections of an Act of the National Assembly invalid, null and void. The National Assembly or A.G Federation or the Federal Inland Revenue Service are not joined as Defendants to the counter-claim. These set of Defendants also want the Court to declare a Law of a State valid and a blanket declaration that the Claimants are to pay their income taxes to Lagos State, when there in nothing before the Court that these Claimants are actually within the tax area of Lagos State. On this point it should be mentioned that the Punch Newspaper in not a local newspaper confined within Lagos State.

In P.N. UDOH TRADING COMPANY LIMITED VABERE (2001) 11 NWLR PT 723 PG 114, the Supreme Court held, while referring to the decision in PEENOK INVESTMENTS LTD V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1982) 12 SC 1, that although a judgment creates law, such law is only between parties to the litigation and their privies, and not any party outside these group.

Further in OKUMU OIL PALM COMPANY LIMITED V ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) 6 NWLR PG 660, the apex Court held that a person not a party to an action (or privy) would not be bound by the result of that action. This being the case, the Court finds and holds that the counter-claim is incompetent.

In the final analysis, the Court holds that the Claimants have no locus standi to institute this action as formulated and that the counter-claim of the 1st & 3rd Defendants is incompetent. Accordingly, the Originating Summons is hereby dismissed. The counter-claim is hereby struck out.



Hon. Justice O. H. Oshodi
Judge

(Vol.10 No.3) OGUNBANKE V. FALASE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF LAGOS STATE
IN THE IKEJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT COURT NO. 48 (LANDS DIVISION) IKEJA
TODAY TUESDAY THE 29TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2009
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE L. B. LAWAL-AKAPO - JUDGE

SUIT NO. ID/168M/09

BETWEEN:

MR. ABAYOMI OLAJIDE OGUNBANKE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT

AND

1. WING COMMANDER TUNDE FALASE
(Attorney of David Hughes Family)
2. WAHAB OJUOLAPE DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS
3. BIODUNOLAPDE
4. DR. ONYEMA AKACHUKWU

RULING

By Originating Summons dated 4th day of March, 2009 brought pursuant to Order 53 Rules 1 (2) & 2 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004, the Applicant is seeking recovery of the landed property situate at No. 9, Ogunbanke Street, Funsho Owoyemi Estate, Ijaiye Ojokoro, Lagos State on the ground that he is entitled to possession and that the person (s) in occupation are without his license or consent.

Arguing the application. Learned Counsel to the Applicant, Mr. 0. A. Ibiayo relied on his 27-paragraph affidavit sworn to on 4th day of March, 2009 and the 8 exhibits attached thereto. He relied on the Reply Affidavit of 11-paragraph sworn to on 6th day of July, 2009. He relied on the Written Address to the Originating Summons dated 4th day of March, 2009 and a Reply Address dated 6th day of July, 2009 and filed the same day. He adopted the contents of the Written Address and urged the court to grant the reliefs contained in the Summons. In opposition. Prince Farombi, Learned Counsel to the 1st - 3rd Defendants relied on his 29-paragraph Counter Affidavit dated 14th day of April, 2009 and one exhibit. He relied on his Written Address dated 14th day of April, 2009 filed the same day. He submitted that the Applicant's Reply Affidavit dated 6th day of July, 2009 was filed outside the statutory 7 days period and as such should be discountenanced. He cited in support of that contention Order 33 Rule 4 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004. He contended further that the Reply Affidavit contained facts outside the 1st - 3rd Defendants' Counter Affidavit and whereas it is supposed to be a Reply to the said Counter Affidavit. He argued that the averments contained therein are legal arguments and conclusions and that it violates Section 87 of the Evidence Act. He submitted that the Written Address in support of the Reply which ought to be points of law are on facts. According to him, that is in breach of Order 39 Rule 1 (4) of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004. He argued that exhibits A009 - A0011 attached to the Reply Affidavit have no bearing to the facts of this case. He urged the court to dismiss the application with substantial cost.

Still, in opposition to the application, Mrs. Onyebuchukwu Learned Counsel to the 4th Defendant aligned herself with the arguments preferred by Prince Farombi, Counsel to the 1st - 3rd Defendants. She relied on her 9-paragraph Counter Affidavit sworn to on 25th day of June, 2009. She stated that she did not file a Written Address in support other Counter Affidavit. Replying on points of law, Mr. Ibiayo submitted that as regards on irregular filing of an affidavit or process, failure to regularise will not invalid or an otherwise valid process. He referred to Order 5 Rule 1 (2) of the 2004 Rules.

I have read the processes filed and written arguments for and against the application. I have also listened to the oral arguments preferred by Learned Counsel on both sides in exposition of their Written Briefs. I shall start with the position taken by Learned Counsel to the 4th Defendant Mrs. Onyebuchukwu. Order 31 captioned "FILING OF WRITTEN ADDRESS"
Order 31 Rule 1 provides:
Order 31 Rule 1: "This order shall apply to ail applications and final addresses."
Order 39 Rules 1-3 provides:-
(1) "Where by these rules any application is authorised to be made to a Judge, such application shall be made by motion which may be supported by affidavit and shall state under what rule of Court or Law the application is brought. Every motion shall be served within 5 days of filing.

(2) Every such application shall be accompanied by a written address in support of the relief sought.

(3) Where the other party intends to oppose the application, he shall within 7 days of the service on him of such application, file his written address and may accompany it with a counter affidavit."

The combined effect of these two provisions is that a position taken in respect of an application must be supported by a Written Address and that if it is not so supported, such a stance should be jettisoned or disregarded. I therefore jettisoned the Counter Affidavit filed by the Counsel to the 4th Defendant in opposition to the application.

The crux of this matter is a claim of proprietary or possessory right over what the Applicant referred to as "No. 9, Ogunbanke Street, Funsho Owoyemi Estate, Ijaiye Ojokoro, Lagos." The Applicant supports his claim with a Deed of Assignment which has annexed to it a Survey Plan which document is marked exhibit A0011. The property referred to in the Deed of Assignment reads: "ALL THAT piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Ijaiye Ojokoro, Agege in the Agege Local Government Area of Lagos State measuring approximately 553.252 square metres more particularly described and delineated in RED in Plan No. BOP/LA/92/3347 dated 25th day of August, 1992 drawn by S. A. Oluwoye, Licensed Surveyor." The Survey Plan in turn referred to the property as being at "Ijaiye Ojokoro Off Lagos - Abeokuta Expressway, Agege Local Government Area of Lagos State." The 1st - 3rd Defendants herein simply referred to as the 1st set of Defendants in paragraph 2 of their Counter Affidavit avers as follows:-
"2 That contrary to paragraph 1 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, there is no known street as "Ogunbanke Street, Funsho Owoyemi Estate" as the street where the subject matter of this case is situated is within David Hughes Estate and has not been named after any individual"

The Applicant in paragraphs 11 — 15 of his affidavit in support conceded that there was a concluded suit in Suit No. ID/I 11/84 - Chief G. Sanni Adu vs. Mr. Hughes between his predecessor-in-title and the person from who the 1st - 3rd Respondents are claiming title (i. e. Estate of David Hughes). The Applicant went further and exhibited the said judgment of LONGE J. as Exhibit A0018.

Paragraphs 11-15 of the Applicant's affidavit are very germane. It reads:-
"11. In late 1995, it came to my vendors the Ojugbele Adetan lyanru Family of Ipaja Road, Magbon, Orile Agege, Lagos had instituted Suit No. ID/111/84 - Chief G. Sanni & Ors. Vs. Mr. Hughes & Anor Before the Lagos High Court, Ikeja Judicial Division, against the 1st Defendant's predecessor-in-title upon a claim in trespass and declaration of title to a vast area of land situate and being at Ojokoro Village, Agege, Lagos and depicted on Plan No. JLA01/90 of 14th January, 1990 admitted in evidence therein as Exhibit 2.

12. It further came to my attention that by a Judgment of Hon. Justice E. F. Longe of 19th July, 1991, the court gave judgment in favour of the Ojugbele Adetan laynru Family - as Plaintiff therein in the following terms;
"Therefore with regards the first relief being claimed by the Plaintiffs in their Writ of Summons, there will be judgment for the Plaintiffs for an Order of right to Certificate of Occupancy over the piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Ojokoro Village, Agege, and shown in exhibit 2 EXCLUDING that part or parcel of land marked RED ON THE SAID PLAN, WHICH IS NOW FOUND to belong to the Defendants as depicted in Exhibit 1C..."

"Finally the judgment of this court, that is the Plaintiffs succeed partially to the relief sought from this court, that is the Plaintiffs are entitled to the statutory right of occupancy in respect of that piece and parcel of land marked green in Exhibit 2 in this case EXCLUDING the area marked RED on the said Exhibit 2, because the area marked RED on the plan is found to belong to the defendants. That is the judgment of the court." (Pages 24 & 25 of judgment)

Now shown to me and marked Exhibit AOO/5 is a Certified True Copy of the said judgment.

13. I am aware that the on Appeal, the Court of Appeal per Oguntade JCA (as he then was) sustained/affirmed the decision of the High Court aforesaid and further found as follows:-

"....The lower court accepted that evidence. It was free to do so. The lower court did not make a declaration of title in favour of the Defendants. It only held that the defendants had shown that they had been in possession of the land of the land verged 'Red' in Exhibit 2 for a long time."

"There is my view a difference between stating that a person had shown that he was in possession of the land and that that person was the owner of the land. Indeed, the lower court did not have to make any pronouncement concerning the Defendant's ownership of the land since the Defendants never brought such a claim before the court." (See pages 12 & 13 of Court of Appeal Judgment)

Now shown to me and marked Exhibit AOO/6 is a Certified True Copy of the said Court of Appeal Judgment (Appeal No. CA/L/292/94).

14. I am also aware that the on Appeal, the Court of Appeal per Oguntade JCA (as he then was) sustained/affirmed the decision of the High Court aforesaid and further found as follows:-

"... The lower court accepted that evidence. It was free to do so. The lower court did not make a declaration of title in favour of the Defendants. It only held that the defendants had shown that they had been in possession of the land verged 'Red' in Exhibit 2 for a long time"
"There is my view a difference between stating that a person had shown that he was in possession of the land and that that person was the owner of the land. Indeed, the lower court did not have to make any pronouncement concerning the Defendant's ownership of the land since the Defendants never brought such a claim before the court." (See pages 12 & 13 of Court of Appeal Judgment)

Now shown to me and marked Exhibit AOO/6 is a Certified True Copy of the said Court of Appeal Judgment (Appeal No. CA/L/292/94).
15. I am further aware that no further appeal (s) was precipitated from the decision of the Court of Appeal aforesaid. Now shown to me and collectively marked ExhibitAOO/7 are Certified True Copy of the Orders of the Supreme Court of 24th January. & 15th June, 2000 and that of 29th April, 2002 evidencing this fact."

The Applicant in paragraph 21 of his affidavit averred that the 1st - 3rd Defendants has completed the construction work which he initiated in respect of the subject matter. The 1st - 3rd Defendants averred that the property in dispute belongs to the 2nd Defendant. They averred further in paragraph 21 of their Counter Affidavit that the 2nd Defendant has completed the property and has put in tenants in occupation. All of these are allegations and counter allegations. Flowing from above, there is therefore the need to determine:-

(i) The address description and identity of the property which is the subject matter of this action.
(ii) Who as between the Applicant and the 1st - 3rd Defendants own the property?
(iii) In whose favour as between the two contending parties is the judgment of LONGE J. in Suit No. ID/I 11/84 - Chief G. Sanni & Ors. Vs. Mr. Hughes & Anor. and the Court of Appeal Judgment in the same in Suit No. CA/L/292/94 which judgments were pleaded by both parties.
(iv) Who as between the Applicant and the 1st - 3rd Defendants is entitled to possession of the said property?
The questions that then arise for determination are:-
(i) Is Order 53 appropriate in the circumstances of this case?
(ii) Can the issues raised in this suit be dealt with on an Originating Summons?

On question one, Order 53 deal with summary possession for recovery of land occupied by squatters or persons without the owner's consent. From the averments in the Affidavit and Counter Affidavit it is evidently clear that the 1st - 3rd Defendants are not squatters and that this set of Defendants are known to the Applicant. I find as a fact and I hold that Order 53 is not applicable to the facts of this case.

On Issue No (ii) Originating Summons is Originating Summons generally is governed by the Provision of Order 3 Rule 5. It provides:-
"3. Any person claiming to be interested under a deed. Will, enactment or other written instrument may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested."

The court in case of:
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS VS. M F. AIGORO (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 179) PG. 376 at 383 - 384
Awogu J. C. A. held:
"An originating Summons is therefore intended to be used in limited situations. It is ideal for construction and interpretation of documents. According to Kayode Eso, J. S. C. in National Bank of Nigeria & Anor. Vs. Lady Alakija & Anor. (1978) 9 - 10 S. C. 59 at 71:- "In other -words, it is our considered view that that originating summons should only be applicable in such circumstances as -where there is no dispute on questions of facts or the likelihood of such dispute. Where, for instance, the issue is to determine short questions of construction, and not matters of such controversy that the justice of the case would demand the settling of pleadings, originating summons could be applicable. For it is to be noted that originating summons is merely a method of proceedings and not one that is meant to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court. "

See also the cases of:-
i. OBASANYA VS. BABAFEMI
(2000) 15 NWLR (PT. 684) PG. 3630

ii. JTMOH VS. OLAWOYE
(2003) 20 NWLR (PT. 828) PG. 307

iii. INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE
(2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) PG. 423 S. C.

iv. NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS. LADY ALAKIJA
(1978) 9 -10 SC 59 at 71.

v. NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA
VS.
LADY ALAKIJA & ANOR (1978) 9 -10 S. C. 59 at 71

From the averments contained in paragraphs 11 - 15 of the Applicant's affidavit and the averments contained in the 1st - 3rd Defendants' Counter Affidavit and the exhibits attached thereto it is clearly not in doubt that the proceedings between the parties are hostile in nature. It is the law that where the proceedings or suit between the parties is hostile in nature, the use or employment of originating summons is clearly inappropriate. - See

NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION
VS.
PATRICK NWANZE
(2008) 4 NWLR (PT. 1076) PG. 92 at 109

NDUKWU-ANYANWU J. C. A. at page 109 held:-

"The principal issue in this suit is -wrongful termination of employment. The learned counsel/or the respondent cannot succeed in hoodwinking this court to believe that the Fundamental Rights of the plaintiff/respondent is the principal issue.

It was indeed wrong for this suit to have been commenced by way of originating summons. This action is definitely hostile and commencement of this suit by originating summons was clearly inappropriate. "

Clearly and beyond any shadow of doubt the facts in this suit are matters of controversy (claimed and counter claims) which are disputed and which will as of necessity require setting out of pleadings and taking of evidence in order to resolve the dispute.

An aggrieved litigant should approach the court by employing proper procedure to ventilate his grievance.

I therefore find as a fact and I hold that the use of Originating Summons in the present case is grossly misplaced. In the result it is hereby ordered that the parties shall file and exchange pleadings within the time permitted by the Rules of this and take such other steps as may be necessary to have the matter heard on its merit.

L.B. LAWAL AKAPO
JUDGE
29/09/2009

(Vol.10 No.2) ODIGIE V. NBC

IN THE HIGH COURT OF LAGOS STATE
IN THE IKEJA JUDICIAL DIVISION, 1KEJA.
TUESDAY THE 19TH DAY OF MAY 2009
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE
JUSTICE O. A. ADEFOPE-OKOJIE

SUITNO.LD/1911/2003

BETWEEN

MR.OSA ODIGIE } CLAIMANT
AND
NIGERIAN BOTTLING COMPANY PLC } DEFENDANT

Claimant present.
Defendant absent.
Oluwatosin Akanfe for Claimant.
No appearance for Defence.

JUDGMENT


CONTINUED FROM LAST WEEK…

In his Reply Address to the Claimant's Final Written Address, learned counsel to the Defendant observed that the Claimant's Final Address was not signed by any Legal Practitioner despite the fact that it emanated from a law Firm and not having been so signed, it is incompetent in law, he submitted. He urged the Court lo hold that in the absence of any Address from the Claimant in the circumstances, only the Defendant could he said to have any Final written Address before the court. The English case of Gunton V, London Borough relied on by the Claimant for the position that a wrongful dismissal of an employee did not put an end to the contract of service but its termination is merely of persuasive effect and can not bind the court. The law is that the only indemnity a wrongfully dismissed employee can get is measured in damages for the period of notice he was entitled to. He urged the court to dismiss the suit in its entirety.

The issues that I consider arise for determination in this suit are an amalgam of those raised by the parties. These issues are the following:
1. Whether the claimant was wrongfully dismissed and if so, what remedies are available to him.

Whether the Claimant is entitled to the prayers sought.
I shall take these issues together.

The Claimant has tendered letters of suspension and summary dismissal issued to him by
the Defendant.

The letter of suspension was tendered as Exhibit C7 and reads as follows:

"NIGERlAN BOTTLING CO. PLC
NBC HOUSE, EBUTEMETTA

MEMORANDUM

From; Director of Human Resources
NBC House, Ebute Metta

To: Mr. Osa Odigwe
NBC Plc
Division Office
Ikeja.

Ref.: Dir-HR./PFN.1904/113
Date: 13th January 2003

SUSPENSION:
Following your arrest by the Police on 9th January 2003 in connection with allegations of a
criminal offence, you are hereby suspended from duty indefinitely without pay
effective from 9th January 2003 until the case against you is dispensed with,

The Compensation and Benefits Manager is by copy of this letter advised to withhold
payment of your salary and transport allowance for the period of your suspension.

(Sgd,) ,

YEMIADE-JOHN

DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES"

The letter of dismissal is Exhibit C8 and reads as follows:

"Nigerian Bottling Company Plc (RC 902)

D-HR/PFN/1904/114
7th February 2003

Mr.OsaOdtgwe
Division Office
NBC Plc
Ikeja
Lagos

Dear Sir

SUMMARY DISMISSAL

You are hereby dismissed from the services of the Company with effect from 9th January 2003 in accordance with Part III Section 18 of the Company's Staff Hand Book.

Consequently, you will be paid the following:
(a) BASIC SALARY/ALLOWANCES
These will be paid to you up to and including 8th January 2003.
(b) SENIOR STAFF PROVIDENT SCHEME
You will be paid your contributions to the scheme only.

Please note that any amount of money that you may be owing to this Company, or any of the sister Companies, through personal loan, purchases, etc., will be recovered from your entitlements. In the event that your entitlements cannot completely defray such indebtedness however, you will be required to take appropriate measures to settle the balance.

Kindly ensure to handover any property of the Company that may be in your possession including the Identity Card issued to you to the Managing Director, or his appointed representative.

Yours faithfully,
For: Nigerian Bottling Company Plc

(Sgd.)
YEMIADE-JOHN
DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES”

As rightfully submitted by both counsel, the contract of service is the pivot or foundation upon which an employee must found his case. In a contract of service reduced into writing by the parties, the court will not look into any matter outside the terms stipulated and agreed between the parties, in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties. See the case of Ibama v Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nig) Lid (2095) f7 NWLR Part 954 Page 364 at Page 379, per Mohammed JSC.

In an ordinary case of master and servant, if there is a written contract, the court must confine itself to it to interpret and understand the circumstances that regulate the rights and obligations of the parties. That is to say, the contract terms as a whole, including any other document incorporated into it by reference or any other method governing the relationship of the parties to the contract. See the case cited by the Defence counsel of Shelf Petroleum Development Co v Lawson-Jack (1998) 4 NWLR Part 545 Page 249 at 270-271 per Uwaifo JCA (as he then was).

In determining whether the Claimant has been wrongfully dismissed, I must confine myself to the terms that regulate the relationship between the parties.

The evidence of both parties is that the documents that regulate the Claimant's contract of employment are the following:

1. Claimant's letter of employment (Exhibit C 1).
2. Managerial Service Agreement (Exhibit D4).
3. Employee Hand Book for Senior Staff Management Staff and Staff Who Are Projection of Management (sic) (Exhibit D11).
4. Code of Conduct and Grievance Procedure (Exhibit C1O).

Meanwhile Exhibits C1, C10 and C11 were tendered by the Claimant, Exhibit 04 was tendered by Tunde Orukotan DW2, the Defendant's Employees Relation Manager.

On the issue of dismissal, Section 18 of the Employee Handbook for Senior Staff (Exhibit C 11) provides as follows;

"Employees who are found guilty of serious misconduct may be summarily dismissed without notice.

Serious misconduct writ include the following;
(a) Dereliction of duty;
(b) Falsifying any of the Company's records;
(c) Refusal to obey a lawful order;
(d) Stealing;
(e) Sleeping on Duty;
(f) Drunkenness or drug addiction;
(g) Misrepresentation of any facts or information required by and given to the Company;
(h) Fighting while on duty;
(i) Corruption or attempting corruption;
(j) Malicious damage to the Company's property;
(k) Conviction for any criminal act;
(l) Unauthorised and unjustified absence from duty for three consecutive days;
(m) Disloyalty, including failure to disclose any misconduct committed or about to be committed against the Company and known to the employee. These examples of serious misconduct are not exhaustive. Any conduct likely to. endanger the Company's property, well being and operation or the safety of others, may constitute serious misconduct.

Employees dismissed because of serious misconduct will receive their salaries up to the date of dismissal plus any earned leave in -accordance with the Conditions of Employment in this Handbooks. All other benefits of whatever nature shall be forfeited except his contributions (only) to the Junior Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme. "

Exhibit C10, the Defendant's Code of Conduct and Grievance Procedure, stipulates disciplinary procedures whereby infractions therein stated are addressed.

The explanation of Tunde Orukotan (DW2), under cross examination, on the applicability of Exhibit C10 to the Claimant's contract is that it is not all infractions that are dealt with under the Defendant's Code of Conduct. While the minor ones are dealt with under the Staff Handbook and an Administrative Panel set up, the more serious ones are reported to the Police. He claimed that the Claimant was dismissed as a result of the Police investigation and in line with the provision of the Staff Handbook. He agreed that the Defendant, in dismissing the Claimant did not follow the Staff Handbook.

The salient facts of this case, as deposed to by DW1, Buki Jinadu, the Corporate Security Manager of the Defendant, are that, following the detection of fraud in the Ikeja Branch by the new Finance Manager of the Branch, which branch was under the supervision of the Claimant, and the commencement of investigations by the Auditors, .Mr. Babasola Esan, the old Finance Manager of the Ikeja Branch absconded and went into hiding. It was discovered that a series of cheques issued over the period June to November 2002 amounting to over N200 Million and which were countersigned by the Claimant were used in defrauding the Defendant, A petition was written by the Defendant and Mr. Esan was arrested, Mr. Es-an confessed and implicated the Claimant as one of the prime beneficiaries.

While the Defendant alleged that the Claimant was never tortured but voluntarily admitted to being a prime beneficiary and also voluntarily handed over his Peugeot 406 and the sums of N2.3 Million in his deposit account and N79,000 in his current account as part of the money he embezzled, the Claimant denied being part of the fraud or that he signed any of the fraudulent cheques. He claimed he was tortured and that his vehicle, the sums into his account and the allocation of land to him were seized by the Defendant under torture by the Police.

Tile contention of the Defendant is that the "Result and' Comparison of Signature" issued by the Police, consequent upon then" investigation and which exonerated the Claimant as having signed the cheques, his signature having been forged, is that this contradicted the first report by the Police. The Claimant also must have interfered with the police investigation, he having been out on bail al the time. The subsequent report by Reverend Ekong, an independent writing analyst, indicted the Claimant.

While I agree with the Defence witness that the report of the hand writing analyst from the Police, Exhibit C9, exonerated the Claimant, the cross examination of the independent hand writing analyst. Reverend Ekong revealed that none of the fraudulent cheques were signed by the Claimant but were a simulation of his signature.

In effect, both handwriting analysts called in by the Defendant, I note. exonerated the Claimant of the fraud,

The counsel to the Defendant urges me not to give any weight to the Police Report, Exhibit C9, the same not having been certified. Not only do I find this request curious as DW1 had referred to this Report in Paragraph 13 and 14 of his Deposition, which Report, he said was in the List of Defendant's document's filed to be relied upon, Reverend Ekong admitted that the Claimant's signatures on the cheques used to defraud the Defendant were not his, but were forgeries. Thus even if I were to reject Exhibit C9, the evidence of DW3, based on his analysis of the disputed documents in Exhibits D1 and D2, have proved that the Claimant was not party to the fraud,

It is undoubtedly true that an employer is under no obligation to give reasons for terminating the employment of his employee. It is also true that it is not necessary that before a servant is dismissed he must be tried before a court of law where the accusation for gross misconduct bordering on criminality. See the case cited by the Defence of Olanrewaju v Afribank (Nig) Plc (2001) 13 NWLR Part 731 Page G91(SC).

It is also true that the Defendant was under no compulsion to try the Claimant before a court of law or indeed base its actions in dismissing the Claimant on the Police Report. Where, however, they seek to discipline him or summarily dismiss him, they are bound, I hold, to follow the procedure that they have agreed should govern the relationship between them. These procedures, they have admitted are as contained in Exhibits C11 and C10. Parof evidence to vary the applicability of these documents to the contract between the parties, as DW2, has sought to do, cannot be given, I hold. See Section 132 of the Evidence Act Cap E8 Laws of Lagos State. 2003.

The preface of Exhibit C10 states as follow:

"This document is an integral part of the Company Staff Handbook for Management and Junior Staff

In Exhibit C10, there have been procedures stipulated for addressing offences, including a number of warnings, facing of disciplinary panels before termination or dismissal can be effected. This was not shown to have been followed in this case.

The Defence counsel has argued that the Managerial Service Agreement (Exhibit D4) binding on both parties has stated in Paragraph 12 that the Claimant's employment may be determined without any notice to him in the event of any misconduct.

This paragraph states as follows;

"In case the Employee shall be guilty of dis-obedience, misconduct or neglect in the conduct of the duties assigned to him or if he shall willfully fail to observe any of his obligations herein the Company may immediately and without notice put an end to and determine this AGREEMENT.

An ordinary interpretation of this clause, which I am bound to give to it, is that the employer, in the case of misconduct can summarily dismiss ah employee. It is no authority for the proposition that in dismissing the employee, the procedures laid down in the contract of agreement between them should not be followed.

It has again been argued by the Defence counsel that the signature on the Claimant's Written Address is not known to law. Counsel to the Claimant has however argued that she signed the Written Address. She distinguished the authority cited by the Defence.

I agree with the Claimant's counsel, in her distinguishing of the case cited by the Defendant's counsel. The Claimant's Written Address even though it is stated to have prepared by "Oluwoie Akanle & Co", is signed "Olusina", who was the counsel that appeared in court on behalf of the Claimant on 28/1/2009 and on 19/2/09, the latter of which dales she adopted the Written Address filed by them. Her adoption of this Address, I hold, has intervened to validate the Written Address as hers.

The Defendant, following reports from Police and following the independent report of their hand writing analyst which reports exculpated the Claimant, appear to me to simply be seeking to indict the Claimant by all means.

Even if (he Claimant's conduct amounted to misconduct, the procedure agreed as binding between them should have been followed before he was dismissed, which was not done.

I accordingly hold the dismissal of the Claimant to be wrongful.

The Defendant has submitted in the alternative that the damages for wrongful dismissal is the amount the Claimant would have earned over the period of notice. This is indeed true, as held in the case cited by him of Chukwumah v Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR Part 289 Page 512 at 537 (SC). This, being a relationship of master and servant, not being a contract with statutory flavour, specific performance of the contract cannot be granted.

From the Claimant's letter of Employment (Exhibit C1), the period stipulated for determination of the contract by either of the parties is one month's notice or one month's salary in lieu of notice.

The Defendant has impugned the Claimant's breakdown. I shad thus use the breakdown given by the Defendant's witness (DW2) in his Statement on Oath, which sum is stated to be N4,075,146.89 per annum. The salary for one month, by my calculation is N339,595.574, which 1 award to him as salary in lieu of notice due to him.

The Defendant's counsel has asked me to strike out paragraphs 7,11,19, 25,27,31 and 44. of the Claimant's Statement on Oath as not having been supported by his readings, I find it unnecessary to deliberate on this issue as reference was not made by me to the facts deposed to therein, neither have those facts formed any of the decisions made by me.

With regard to the seizure of the Claimant's money and vehicle, the attitude of the Courts is aptly put In the case of Jacob Omman v. Darfington Ekpe (2000) 1 NWLR Part 641 Page 365 at 373 to 374 paragraph G-B.

"There Acholonu JCA (as he then was) had this to say:

"Now Nwanedo the learned counsel for the Respondent derided Exh 1 which he submitted was made in the Police form and the contents was made 4 full years before the action, under duress as it was made while the Respondent was in Police custody. It is most unfortunate that our citizens now use the Army and police personnel to collect debts from fellow business associates whether the debt is real or imaginary. Any documents signed in the presence of the police and relating to a civil claim shall be viewed with suspect particularly if the person against whom it will affect was in custody or under some detention or handicap that he cannot freely enter into a contract-what with enforcement officers breathing down his neck. Any document that seeks to establish the existence of a contractual relationship which takes place under the very watchful eyes of the police to whom a purely civil matter is brought to its attention to enforce or put a fear of God into the other side will certainly not be enforced as there is no consensus and is voidable. Exhibit 1 does not therefore avail the appellant", (sic)

In the present case, I hold that the Claimant's surrender of these documents was not voluntary. From the undisputed evidence of the Claimant, confirmed in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the Statement on Oath of Buki Jinadu (DW1), the Corporate Security Manager of the Defendant, the "surrender" of the sums in the fixed deposit and current account of the Claimant, together with his Peugeot 406 were made while the Claimant was in detention.

The Claimant has produced documents from Zenith Bank (Exhibits C16(1) to C16(3) giving the details of the Deposit Account in both his name and that of Kemi Odigie, presumably his wife, which account was opened since August 2001 in the sum of N1,923,893.15 to June 2002 when it rose to N2,341,922.31. This sum is clearly before the period of the fraud, which by the evidence of DW1, Buki Jinadu, was between June to November 2002.

The Claimant has also tendered his Letter of Allocation and receipts from the Lagos State Government (Exhibits C13) in respect of the allocation of land at Isheri North Residential Scheme, to Odigie Mrs. Oluwakemi Omobose, which documents, he said were seized by the Defendant in conjunction with the Police.

These documents, I have held, were taken from the Claimant under duress, in the absence of an order of court detaining these properties or giving the same over to the Defendant, the Defendant, I hold, has absolutely no right to detain these properties. These properties, including the sum in the Claimant's accounts shall be returned to him. On the question of the interest to be awarded on the fixed deposit account, though the Claimant seeks 21% per annum, the interest rate granted on the latest statement issued by Zenith Bank on the said deposit (Exhibit C16(3) is 18.5% per annum.

The Claimant, I hold, is entitled to be awarded interest, as the law is that where money is owing, and I add, withheld, and that other is driven to court, interest will be awarded from the time the amount is withheld. See National Bank v Savol West Africa (1W) 3 NWLR Part 333 Page 435. I accordingly hold that the Claimant is entitled to payment of Interest on the said deposit at the rate of 18.5% from the date the deposit was seized by the Defendant until the date of payment.

White it is not clear what date the deposit was seized by the Defendant or "surrendered" by the Claimant, it is not in dispute that it is a date prior to his letter of dismissal served on him on 14/2/2003, after he had resumed his employment. It is thus safe for me to grant interest with effect from 14th February 2003,

For all the reasons given by me above, while some of the reliefs sought are refused, the claim of the Claimant succeeds in the main. I find that the Defendant wrongfully dismissed the Claimant. Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary contract of employment with no statutory flavour, specific performance of the contract of service cannot be granted. The Claimant can also not be awarded salary or benefits for a period he did not work. The damages for the wrongful dismissal are the period of notice he would have worked for, which in this case is one month's notice, which I have said to be N339.595.57k.

I accordingly order as follows:

1. I grant a declaration that the Defendant is contractually bound to the Claimant to apply and follow the procedure prescribed by the Defendant's Code of Conduct and Grievance Procedure which is part of its Staff Handbook.
2. I grant a declaration that the Claimant cannot be validly and lawfully dismissed from the employment of the Defendant except in accordance with the disciplinary process provided for by the Defendant's Code of Conduct and Grievance Procedure which is part of its Staff Handbook.
3. I refuse a declaration that the Defendant's letter Ref. DHR/PFN/1904/114 dated the 7th day of February 2003 dismissing the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant is null and void and of no effect.
4. I refuse an order setting aside the said letter of summary dismissal.
5. I grant a declaration that the summary dismissal of the Claimant is wrongful.
6. I refuse the 6111 and 7th reliefs seeking for a declaration of nullity of the letter of suspension and for setting aside of (he said letter.
7. I refuse the 8th relief directing the payment of the Claimant's salaries and allowances from January 2003 until the date of judgment.
8. I refuse the 9"1 prayer for an order of injunction.
9. I refuse the Alternative Prayer in No, 9 for payment of the Claimant's salary for the unexpired residue of his employment. I also refuse the prayer for his retirement with full benefits accruing at the age of 55 years. I further refuse his prayer for payment of the sum of N30 Million as retirement benefits or for damages of N200 Million for his unlawful dismissal. The Defendant shall however pay to the Claimant his full benefits due and owing to him until 14th March 2003, which is the date the termination of his employment should have taken effect from, he having received the letter of summary dismissal (Exhibit C8) by his evidence, on 14/2/03.
10.I declare that the Defendant is not entitled to seize and appropriate to itself the Claimant's fixed deposit in the sum of N2.3 Million.
11. The Defendant is directed to refund to the Claimant the sum of N2.3 Million with interest at the rate of 18.5% from 14th February 2003 until payment.
12.I declare that the Defendant is not entitled to seize the Claimant's 406 Peugeot Car Registration No HS 578 KJA.
13. The Defendant shall return forthwith the said car, restoring it to the condition it was in before the seizure.
14. I declare that the seizure of the Claimant's Allocation Paper dated 22nd August 2001 in respect of a plot of land (Block 54 Plot 15) at Isheri North is illegal, null and void.
15. I grant an order directing the Defendant to return forthwith to the Claimant the Allocation Paper dated 22nd August 2001 and Payment Receipt in respect of a plot of land (Block 54 Plot 15) at Isheri North.